Improved and Developed Upper Bound of Price of Anarchy in Two Echelon
  Case by Shinzato, T. & Kaku, I.
ar
X
iv
:0
90
6.
54
89
v1
  [
q-
fin
.G
N]
  3
0 J
un
 20
09
1
Improved and Developed Upper Bound of Price of
Anarchy in Two Echelon Case
Takashi Shinzato and Ikou Kaku
Department of Management Science and Engineering
Graduate School of Systems Science and Technology, Akita Prefectual University
shinzato@akita-pu.ac.jp ikou kaku@akita-pu.ac.jp
Abstract—Price of anarchy, the performance ratio, which could
characterize the loss of efficiency of the distributed supply chain
management compared with the integrated supply chain man-
agement is discussed by utilizing newsvendor problem in single
period which is well-known. In particular, some of remarkable
distributed policies are handled, the performance ratios in each
case which have been investigated in the previous works are
analyzed theoretically and the tighter upper bound of price of
anarchy and the lower bound are presented. Furthermore our
approach is developed based on a generalized framework and a
geometric interpretation of price of anarchy is appeared via the
literature of convex optimization.
Index Terms—newsvendor problem, price of anarchy, convex
optimization, inequalities, geometric interpretation, autoregres-
sion model with χ square noise
I. INTRODUCTION
MEASURING the efficiency of supply chains playsan important role in operations management because
there exit many complicated factors (various contracts, order
policies and physical structures) which could influence the
decision making process. In practice, several formulae have
been reported in most of the earlier studies [3], [5], [8], [14],
[19], [20]. In history, bullwhip effect, which could compare the
variance of orders with that of demands, has been widely used
to evaluate the efficiency of supply chain management in the
stationary market [5]. Although it is straightforward to forecast
the optimal order in the following term via finite instance
of demand and order observed according to the manner of
bullwhip effect, if the market behaves in equilibrium, it is too
hard to determine the optimal order of goods in the typical
case with respect to the given supply chain. While, as another
approach, recently numerical experiments in Cachon (2004)
indicate that the relative efficiency of a two-stage decentralized
supply chain could be as low as 70-90% for either push or
pull configurations with price-only contract policy [4]. Perakis
and Roels (2007) mathematically extends Cachon’s works into
several different supply chain configurations such as push
or pull inventory positioning, two or more stages, serial or
assembly systems, single or multiple competing suppliers, and
single or multiple retailers [14]. By introducing the concept
of price of anarchy into supply chain, which can measure
the ratio of the performance of the centralized system to the
worst performance of the decentralized system (Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou 1999 and Papadimitriou 2001), they found
that even in a two-stage supply chain the loss of efficiency
might be more than 42% under the same conditions of price-
only contract, and pointed that a pull inventory configuration
generally outperforms a push configuration [11], [13], [20].
The contribution of Perakis and Roels (2007) is one of the
most pioneer investigations in quantifying the performance of
supply chain. However, since their argument is hard to be guar-
anteed mathematically, rigorously and sufficiently anywhere,
we need to improve several points in their logic for more
practical use. In this paper, tighter upper bound of price of
anarchy is theoretically proved and a lower bound of price of
anarchy is presented firstly due to more accurate treatment.
Furthermore a geometric interpretation of price of anarchy is
also demonstrated which can give a clear illustration of the
loss of efficiency of the given distributed supply chain. We
only consider the both bounds of price of anarchy in two
echelon case because of the most fundamental case, however
it turns out that our approach would be simply applied in more
complicated case.
This remainder of the present paper is organized as follows;
in the next section, the newsvendor problem is presented
for simplicity of our discussion, and the derived results in
the previous work [14] is introduced briefly. Furthermore an
improved upper bound and a lower bound of the loss of
efficiency are explained. Section III addresses a generalization
of newsvendor problem and assesses the optimal inventory
levels and the performance ratios in each mode. In Section
IV, a geometric interpretation of price of anarchy is intuitively
provided and we confirm that the performance ratio and the
analytical procedure handled here are possible to be one of
the most unbeatable frameworks. The final section is devoted
to a summary and future work.
II. MODEL SETTING
Concerned with distribution of goods and information shar-
ing, supply chain management is one of the most vital interests
in the cross-disciplinary fields. As one of the most pivotal
topics, we discuss here the manner of the inventory man-
agement theoretically, in particular, (1) how to determine the
optimal inventory level with respect to the given supply chain
management and (2) how to assess the loss of efficiency of
suboptimal policy. For simplicity of our argument, we restrict
the model which is well-defined and is introduced below.
Therefore applying our demonstration, one could indeed im-
prove and develop this approach so as to resolve more practical
case.
2A. Newsvendor problem
Newsvendor problem is modeled as follows; if the firm
prepares the inventory of goods Q and the order in the market
is ξ , his profit in the single period is expected as follows;
π(ξ) : = −cQ+ pmin(Q, ξ), (1)
where the purchasing cost and the selling price describe c
and p, respectively, furthermore min(Q, ξ) denotes the lesser
value of Q and ξ. Note that c ≤ p is needed in nature since
the firm won’t prefer to stock and buy the goods in the case
c > p (briefly the profit π(ξ) ≤ 0 at c > p in other words),
and notice that Q and ξ are assumed as nonnegative and real
numbers without the loss of generality. Here the opportunity
loss is not handled and the inventory space is large enough as a
matter of convenience, however it turns out that our approach
would be simply applied in the case with opportunity loss
and the upper bound of inventory level. Generally speaking,
it is too hard to estimate that the demand in each single
period is fixed. Hence, let us propose that the demand ξ is
stochastically drawn from the given density function f(ξ) with
the cumulative probability. Now, the expected aggregate profit
is represented as follows;
Π :=
∫ ∞
0
dξf(ξ)π(ξ) = −cQ+ p
∫ Q
0
dξF (ξ) , (2)
where F (ξ) :=
∫∞
ξ
dxf(x) describes the cumulative proba-
bility whose stochastic variable is greater than or equal to ξ
and Π is a concave function of the inventory quantity strictly
(show appendix A-B). Note that Π = 0 at Q = 0 is required
for any distribution of demand by definition and it implies that
no stock is no benefit. Moreover as trivial, the supremum of
the expected entire benefit Π is indeed greater than or equal
to zero because of the previous notice.
The production planner’s purpose in general is to maximize
his expected gross benefit Π by adjusting the inventory level
Q in typical situation. However, nowadays the logistics, the
distribution of goods in supply chain behaves like bloodstream
in the human society, the necessity not only of the integrated
inventory management but also of the distributed inventory
management has been recognized. In the given distributed
configurations, the problem who makes to store the inventory
and/or who needs to decide the wholesale price in supply chain
is one of the most vital issues, furthermore it is also important
how one examines the loss of efficiency of the distributed
management in some of remarkable configurations compared
to the integrated management.
B. Centralized supply chain
Let us review here the problem how the inventory level
Q is derived in order to maximize the expected entire profit
of the given integrated (or centralized) supply chain. From
eq. (2), the unique optimal solution which can be desired is
intuitively derived as follows; Qc := F
−1
(r) where r := c/p
and F−1(y)(= x) represents the inverse function of F (x)(=
y). Since the second term in eq. (2) is a concave function of
Q (show appendix A-B), it turns out that the unique optimal
solution is strictly determined.
C. The profits in two echelon case
The counterpart of the centralized case in supply chain
management, the distributed (or decentralized) supply chain
management is explained here. In the distributed case the
expected profit could be divided into two distinguished profit
functions as follows; Π = ΠM + ΠR in push serial supply
chain and Π = ΞM + ΞR in pull serial supply chain. Firstly,
ΠM := (w−c)Q and ΠR := −wQ+p
∫ Q
0 dξF (ξ) indicate the
manufacturer’s entire profit and the retailer’s whole benefit,
respectively, in the case that the retailer makes to stock the
inventory in push serial supply chain. While ΞM := −cQ +
w
∫ Q
0 dξF (ξ) and Ξ
R := (p − w)
∫ Q
0 dξF (ξ) describe the
manufacturer’s aggregate profit and the retailer’s total benefit,
respectively, in the situation that the manufacturer makes to
store the inventory in pull serial supply chain. In each case,
the leader decides the wholesale price w (note that c ≤ w ≤ p
is required in practice, because these profits are satisfied with
positivity) in order to maximize the leader’s expected whole
profit, while the follower should choose selfishly the optimal
inventory level Q by employing the optimization problem
of the follower’s expected benefit with respect to the given
wholesale price, that is, it is the scenario of Stackelberg
leadership game [16] . In the previous investigations, the
analysis of the class of increasing generalized failure rate
distribution, where one ensures that the optimization problem
in the decentralized configurations could possess the well-
defined optimal solution, has been reported comparatively well
with regard to several concrete distributed configurations in
two echelon case as follows;
(a) The manufacturer is the decision maker in push serial
supply chain. Qd is determined by the following
equation; F (Qd) (1− g (Qd)) = r where g(Q) :=
Qf(Q)
F (Q)
is utilized. In this paper g(Q) is assumed as
a nondecreasing function of Q and 0 ≤ g(Q) ≤ 1
because it is guaranteed that the optimal solution of
the follower’s optimization problem is unique. Thus
g(Q) is termed as increasing generalized failure rate.
In addition, the desirable wholesale price is yielded
as w = pF (Qd).
(b) The retailer is the decision maker in push serial
supply chain. Qd is consistent with the inventory
level in the integrated supply chain management,
because the inventory is stored at the downstream
site and it is to be expected that the wholesale price
is equal to the purchasing cost.
(c) The manufacturer is the decision maker in pull
serial supply chain. Qd is also consistent with the
inventory level in integrated supply chain, because
the inventory is stored at the leader’s site and it is
to be desired that the wholesale price corresponds to
the selling price.
(d) The retailer is the decision maker in pull serial
supply chain. Qd is decided by the following equa-
tion; F (Qd) (1 + l (Qd))−1 = r where l(Q) :=
f(Q)
F
2
(Q)
∫ Q
0 dξF (ξ) is employed and the optimal
wholesale price is derived as w = c/F (Qd). If g(Q)
3is increasing generalized failure rate, then l(Q) is
nondecreasing function of Q strictly [4], [14].
In practice, the production planner should choose the most
appropriate distributed inventory management in some re-
markable configurations by some means. For that reason, our
purpose is here to examine the following measurement so as
to assess the loss of efficiency of each configuration. Price
of anarchy, the performance ratio which can characterize the
loss of efficiency of the expected whole benefit of the given
decentralized inventory management compared with that of the
given centralized inventory management and which is well-
known, is denoted as follows;
PoA : =
−cQc + p
∫ Qc
0
dξF (ξ)
−cQd + p
∫ Qd
0
dξF (ξ)
, (3)
where eq. (2) is utilized and it turns out that PoA is greater
than or equal to unit in general (show appendix A-A).
D. Rigorous results derived in the previous works
With respect to the ensemble of increasing generalized
failure rate, the rigorous results of price of anarchy were
presented in the previous work as follows [14]; (a) PoA ≤
(1 − k)−
1
k − (1 − k)−1, (b) PoA = 1, (c) PoA = 1 and (d)
PoA ≤ (1+l)1+
1
l −(1+l), where k := g (Qd) and l := l (Qd)
are utilized (the indices are mentioned in the previous subsec-
tion). Indeed, although the previous work explained that the
upper bounds in (a) and (d) are comparatively tight, it is hard
to assess the loss of efficiency in precision and in good faith,
therefore we discuss more conscientiously and obtain a tighter
upper bound compared with the derived one in Perakis and
Roels (2007), and a tighter lower bound with respect to the
class of increasing generalized failure rate exactly.
E. An upper and lower bound of cumulative probability
From the definition of increasing generalized failure rate,
logF (ξ) = −
∫ ξ
0
dy g(y)
y
is analytically yielded where F (0) =
1. Moreover with regard to the ensemble of increasing general-
ized failure rate, max
(
F (Qc) , F (Qd) (Qd)
s
ξ−s
)
≤ F (ξ) ≤
max
(
F (Qc) , F (Qd) (Qd)
k ξ−k
)
is obtained where Qd ≤
ξ ≤ Qc and k = g (Qd) and s := g (Qc) are employed.
According to the ratio of the inventory level in the integrated
case to the one in the distributed case, α := Qc/Qd, we
obtain an upper bound and a lower bound of the integration
as follows;
L(α, s) ≤
∫ Qc
Qd
dξF (ξ)
≤
{
QdF (Qd)
α1−k−1
1−k (1 − k)
− 1
k ≤ α
L(α, k) (1 − k)−
1
s ≤ α ≤ (1− k)−
1
k
(4)
where L(α, t) := QdF (Qd)
[
(1 − k)α+ t(1−k)
1− 1
t −1
1−t
]
is used.
Notice that α < (1− k)− 1s is not satisfied with the boundary
condition, F (Qc) = r and L(α, t) is a nonincreasing
and convex function of t for any α. Since the integration
in eq. (4) is evaluated more accurately compared with
their insufficient discussion in [14], the comparative
tight upper bound of price of anarchy and the lower
bound are expected fortunately. Furthermore, since the
cumulative probability is a nonincreasing function, the
upper bound in this interval Qd ≤ ξ is not possible to
exceed the probability at Q = 0 in nature, the inequality
F (Qd) ≤ F (ξ) ≤ min
(
1, F (Qd) (Qd)
k ξ−k
)
is derived,
and an upper bound and a lower bound of the integration,
QdF (Qd) ≤
∫ Qd
0
dξF (ξ)
≤ QdF (Qd)

1 + k
(
1− F
1
k
−1
(Qd)
)
1− k

 , (5)
is obtained.
F. Both bounds of price of anarchy; the manufacturer is the
leader in push serial supply chain
According to the argument in the previous work [14], by
definition, one can replace price of anarchy as follows; PoA =
1+
∫
Qc
Qd
dξ(F (ξ)−r)
−rQd+
∫
Qd
0
dξF (ξ)
. Thus employing eq. (4) and eq. (5), an
upper bound
PoA ≤
{
(1− k)−
1
k − (1− k)−1 (1 − k)−
1
k ≤ α
α1−k−(1−k)2α
k(1−k) − (1− k)
−1 otherwise
(6)
and a lower bound
PoA ≥
s(1− k)1−
1
s − s
1− s
−
kr
1
k
−1(1− k)1−
1
k − k
1− k
k +
k − kr
1
k
−1(1− k)1−
1
k
1− k
, (7)
are simply yielded. It turns out that the numerator of the first
term of the upper bound in (1 − k)− 1s ≤ α ≤ (1 − k)− 1k
in eq. (6) is a nondecreasing and concave function of α.
The supremum of the right hand side in eq. (6) was already
presented in [14], while the comparative tight upper bound is
to be desired in (1 − k)− 1s ≤ α ≤ (1 − k)− 1k . Fig. 1 shows
that in the limit of k → 0 for any s > k, both bounds at
α → (1 − k)−
1
s are close to unit and if s = k, the lower
bound

1 + 2−k(
1−r 1k−1
)
(1−k)1− 1k


−1
is greater than or equal
to unit at α ≥ (1− k)− 1k . While Fig. 2 indicates the behavior
at k = 0.20 and r = 0.40 and it is found that both bounds are
greater than unit at any ratio α.
G. Both bounds of price of anarchy; the retailer is the leader
in pull serial supply chain
In this case, compared with the previous subsection, k and
s are rewritten as 1 − k = (1 + l)−1 and 1 − s = (1 + t)−1,
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Fig. 1. The ratio α v.s. both bounds of price of anarchy at k = 0.01,
F (Qd) = 0.5 and s ≃ 1.0
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Fig. 2. The ratio α v.s. both bounds of price of anarchy at k = 0.20,
F (Qd) = 0.5 and s ≃ 1.0
respectively, where l = l (Qd) and t ≥ l, then an upper bound
and a lower bound;
PoA ≤


(1 + l)1+
1
l − (1 + l) (1 + l)1+
1
l ≤ α
(1 + l)2α
1
1+l − α
l
− (1 + l) otherwise
PoA ≥
t(1 + l)
1
t − t+ l − lr
1
l (1 + l)
1
l
(1 + l)−1 + l − lr
1
l (1 + l)
1
l
are also yielded.
H. Example: Nonnegative order drawn from normal Gaussian
distribution
Let us confirm the effectiveness of our approach with a
novel toy model. For simplicity, it is assumed that the demands
are independently and identically distributed according to most
of the previous works. Here the density function of demand,
f(ξ) is satisfied with 2√
2π
e−
ξ2
2 for ξ ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise.
One can easily validate that g(Q) of this model is increasing
generalized failure rate. Thus Qc and Qd in the two cases of
PoA 6= 1, are illustrated in Fig. 3. Furthermore, as shown in
Fig. 4 and in Fig. 5 that the numerical results of PoA and the
derived bounds are compared with each other in the case that
the manufacturer is the decision maker in push serial supply
chain and in the case that the retailer is the decision maker
in pull serial supply chain, respectively. In conclusion, it turns
out that our approach is valid in this model.
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Qd, the retailer is the leader in pull serial supply chain.
Qd, the manufacturer is the leader in push serial supply chain.
Fig. 3. The ratio r = c/p v.s. Qc and Qd.
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Fig. 4. The ratio r v.s. price of anarchy and the bounds. In push serial supply
chain, the manufacturer is the decision maker.
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Fig. 5. The ratio r v.s. price of anarchy and the bounds. In pull serial supply
chain, the retailer is the decision maker.
5I. Example: Autoregression model with χ square noise
As the real-world data analysis, it is natural that the de-
mands are correlated with one another, for instance, a market
trend, rather than that they are independently and identically
distributed [10], [17], [18]. However, in most of the earlier
studies, for simplicity, the demands were independently and
identically distributed and this assumption is obviously not
practical since real-world date are usually somewhat biased
and correlated across the instance. In general, the demand
might consist of the trend effect which implies correlation and
an uncertain factor which connotes noise (c.f. bullwhip effect).
Therefore as the first step, let us handle a novel toy model
in order to confirm whether or not these bounds of price of
anarchy which have been presented in this paper are influenced
by the correlation in the market. Well, the demand at discrete
time T (denoted by ξT ) is generated from the following
autoregression model; ξT+1 = βξT +σ2χ2T , where β indicates
a dumping coefficient in 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 and χ2T , the random
variable at time T , is drawn from χ square distribution with
one degree of freedom (in addition, for simplicity each noise
is assumed to be independently and identically distributed
and σ2 implies a noise intensity). Although there is not an
aggressive premise, because the demand is guaranteed to be
always nonnegative, this toy model is accepted here. Now,
1e-07
1e-06
1e-05
0.0001
0.001
0.01
100 1000 10000
f(ξ)
ξ
Fig. 6. It is well-known that the density function f(ξ) is analytically yielded
via the cumulant generating function, the logarithm function of characteristic
function, log
∫
∞
0
dξf(ξ)eiθξ = − 1
2
∑
∞
k=1
log
(
1− 2iθσ2βk
)
[7]. How-
ever we estimate here the density function utilizing the histogram numerically
evaluated by 0.5× 109 demands which are consisted of the sequences which
are randomly chosen from the times series, which is stable, and we fit the
logarithm of the density function derived numerically into the fifth-degree
polynomial function of log ξ, which is supported by minimization of the the
leave-one-out cross validation error [18]. f(ξ) at β = 0.9 and σ2 = 100.0
is illustrated in this figure.
given β and σ2, and the density function of demand f(ξ)
is stable, one can evaluate the loss of efficiency, PoA with
respect to the ratio r = c/p, furthermore, we can confirm
whether or not both bounds are valid. The density function of
demand, f(ξ) at β = 0.9 and σ2 = 100.0 is illustrated in Fig.
6, Qc and Qd in the two cases are depicted in Fig. 7. As shown
in Fig. 8 and in Fig. 9 that the numerical result of PoA and
the upper and lower bounds are compared with one another at
β = 0.9 and σ2 = 100.0 in the case that the manufacturer is
the leader in push serial supply chain and in the case that the
retailer is the leader in pull serial supply chain, respectively.
Likewise, it turns out that our procedure is validly supported
in this correlated model.
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Fig. 7. The ratio v.s. the inventory levels at β = 0.9 and σ2 = 100.0.
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Fig. 8. The ratio r v.s. price of anarchy and the derived bounds. In push
serial supply chain, the manufacturer is the decision maker.
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Fig. 9. The ratio r v.s. price of anarchy and the derived bounds. In pull
serial supply chain, the retailer is the decision maker.
6III. GENERALIZED FRAMEWORK
We have discussed price of anarchy, the performance ratio
which can characterize the loss of efficiency of the given
distributed supply chain management compared with the in-
tegrated management policy, based on newsvendor problem
which is well-known. In particular, some of remarkable dis-
tributed policies are handled, the performance ratios in each
case, for instance, who makes to store the inventory and/or
who needs to decide the wholesale price, are analyzed the-
oretically, and the tighter upper bound of price of anarchy
and the lower bound are presented. However, two points
should be noted here that these results are not restricted
to newsvendor problem (hereafter it is termed as original
newsvendor problem) and price of anarchy is possible to be
regarded as one of the most unbeatable feature quantity with
respect to a broad class of optimization problems.
In this section, let us propose a generalization of the
approach treated in the previous section (hereafter generalized
newsvendor problem is handled intuitively, however it is also
demonstrated in the literature of supply chain management
as a matter of convenience). According to our argument,
one could replace the profit function in eq. (1) as π(ξ) =
−cQ + pm(ξ,Q), i.e. m(ξ,Q) = min(ξ,Q); it turns out
that m(ξ,Q) can describe a more complicated policy of price
contracts, which could sufficiently characterize a market trend,
for instance, the order of hard-to-find items in practice. Now,
for simplicity of the discussion, we prepare the expected
aggregate profit,
Π : = −cQ+ pM(Q), (8)
where M(Q) :=
∫∞
0
dξf(ξ)m(ξ,Q) and X (Q) := ∂M(Q)
∂Q
are defined. In order to extend the method, we should explain
m(ξ,Q), M(Q) and X (Q) simply. Firstly m(ξ,Q) is here
an arbitrary function which is satisfied with the following
conditions, ∂
2M(Q)
∂Q2
= ∂X (Q)
∂Q
≤ 0 and M(0) = 0. Because
it is required for the concavity of the expected total profit
function (one would not presume that m(ξ,Q) is a concave
function of Q in general, i.e. m(ξ,Q) = min(ξ,Q)) and
M(0) = 0 is necessary so as to connote that no stock is
no benefit. Furthermore from X (Q) and M(0) = 0, M(Q)
is possible to be replaced as M(Q) =
∫ Q
0
dξX (ξ) (it is not
required to disclose the density function of demand in gen-
eralized newsvendor problem), where X (ξ) can be regarded
as F (ξ) in the previous section. Further it implies that X (Q)
is assumed as positive because the optimal inventory level is
nonnegative. Lastly, c ≤ pX (0) is needed in nature (briefly
Π ≤ 0 for any inventory level is satisfied at c ≥ pX (0)).
A. Centralized case and profit functions
The unique optimal solution in the integrated case of
generalized newsvendor problem is denoted as follows; Qc =
X−1(r), where r = c/p (notice that 0 ≤ c
pX (0) ≤ 1) and
X−1(y)(= x) represents the inverse function of X (x)(= y).
Next, the expected profit function Π in eq. (8) is possi-
ble to be divided into two distinguished parts in push and
pull configurations as follows; (i) ΠM := (w − c)Q, (ii)
ΠR := −wQ + pM(Q), (iii) ΞM := −cQ + wM(Q) and
(iv) ΞR := (p − w)M(Q), where the wholesale price w is
satisfied with c ≤ w ≤ pX (0) in push serial supply chain
and c/X (0) ≤ w ≤ p in pull serial supply chain, respectively.
According to the previous argument, price of anarchy is also
denoted as follows;
PoA :=
−cQc + pM(Qc)
−cQd + pM(Qd)
. (9)
In the follows, we explain how the optimal inventory level
and the desirable wholesale price of each decentralized case
are determined so as to measure the loss of efficiency.
B. Manufacturer is the leader in push serial supply chain
It is well-known that PoA in this situation of original
newsvendor problem is not always equal to unit. In practice
one can derive the optimal solution iteratively via the saddle
point equation as follows;
Qd = X
−1(ε)
=⇒
⇐=
ε = r + g(Qd)X (Qd) (10)
where ε := w/p and a novel function, g(Q) :=
−Q ∂
∂Q
logX (Q) are already used. By definition, g(Q) is a
nonnegative function of Q in general. Furthermore in order
to determine the unique solution of the decentralized manage-
ment, we assume that g(Q) is increasing generalized failure
rate (note that if g(Q) is termed as increasing generalized
failure rate, then g(Q) is satisfied with 0 ≤ g(Q) ≤ 1 and
∂g(Q)
∂Q
≥ 0).
In addition, although this iteration connotes the recursive
procedure in order to resolve the optimal inventory level
systematically in the distributed system, using eq. (10), one can
represent also the following relation as X (Qd) (1− g(Qd)) =
r, where the desirable wholesale price is w = pX (Qd) by the
definition of ε.
C. Retailer is the leader in push serial supply chain
In this case, PoA is equal to unit because the derivative of
the leader’s expected profit ΠR with respect to the wholesale
price w is nonpositive, the optimal wholesale price is desirable
to be consistent with the purchasing cost in c ≤ w ≤ pX (0),
therefore it is possible to be regarded as the integrated system
as the follower’s benefit is zero, that is, Qd is equivalent to
Qc.
D. Manufacturer is the leader in pull serial supply chain
Fortunately, PoA coincides with the value derived in origi-
nal newsvendor problem because the derivative of the leader’s
expected profit ΞM with respect to the wholesale price w is
nonnegative, the optimal wholesale price is desirable to be
equal to the selling price in c/X (0) ≤ w ≤ p, therefore
it is possible to be regarded as the integrated system as the
follower’s benefit is zero, that is, Qd is consistent with Qc.
7E. Retailer is the leader in pull serial supply chain
It is sure that PoA in the last case of original newsvendor
problem is not less than unit. With respect to generalized
newsvendor problem, let us evaluate the optimal solution
sequentially utilizing the steepest descent method as follows;
Qd = X
−1(δ)
=⇒
⇐=
1
δ
=
1
r
−
l(Qd)
X (Qd)
, (11)
where δ := c/w and a novel function l(Q) := −
∂
∂Q
logX (Q)
∂
∂Q
logM(Q)
are employed. Under the definition, l(Q) is a nonnegative
function of the inventory level in nature. Moreover, so as
to derive the unique solution of the distributed management,
we require that l(Q) is a nondecreasing function of Q as
the sufficient condition (if g(Q) is assumed as increasing
generalized failure rate, then l(Q) is a nondecreasing function
of Q, show appendix A-D).
Additionally, although this iteration derived here implies the
algorithmic procedure so as to assess the optimal inventory
level in the decentralized system, applying eq. (11), the
following relation, X (Qd) (1 + l(Qd))−1 = r, is obtained
exactly where the desirable wholesale price is w = c/X (Qd).
F. Both bounds of price of anarchy
From the above discussion, it turns out that PoA in the two
distributed cases that the retailer is the leader in push serial
supply chain and the manufacturer is the leader in pull serial
supply chain, respectively, namely the inventory is stocked at
the leader’s site, is similar to the derived results of original
newsvendor problem. Herein the others are discussed.
Firstly we explain the case that the manufacturer is
the decision maker in push serial supply chain. Utiliz-
ing the definition of increasing generalized failure rate,
logX (ξ) = logX (0) −
∫ ξ
0
dy g(y)
y
is assessed. Thus with
respect to the class of increasing generalized failure rate
distribution, max (X (Qc),X (Qd)(Qd)sξ−s) ≤ X (ξ) ≤
max
(
X (Qc),X (Qd)(Qd)
kξ−k
)
is derived where Qd ≤ ξ ≤
Qc and k = g(Qd) and s = g(Qc) are represented, respec-
tively. According to the ratio α = Qc/Qd, one can analyze an
upper bound and a lower bound of the integration as follows;
L(α, s) ≤
∫ Qc
Qd
dξX (ξ)
≤
{
QdX (Qd)
α1−k−1
1−k (1− k)
− 1
k ≤ α
L(α, k) (1− k)−
1
s ≤ α ≤ (1− k)−
1
k
where L(α, t) := QdX (Qd)
[
(1− k)α+ t(1−k)
1− 1
t −1
1−t
]
is employed. Moreover QdX (Qd) ≤
∫ Qd
0 dξX (ξ) ≤
QdX (Qd)
[
1 + k1−k
(
1−
(
X (Qd)
X (0)
) 1
k
−1)]
is calculated since
X (Qd) ≤ X (ξ) ≤ min
(
X (0),X (Qd)(Qd)
kξ−k
)
is obtained
in ξ ≤ Qd. Therefore an upper bound and a lower bound
of price of anarchy in generalized newsvendor problem are
evaluated as follows;
PoA ≤
{
(1− k)−
1
k − (1− k)−1 (1 − k)−
1
k ≤ α
α1−k−(1−k)2α
k(1−k) − (1− k)
−1 otherwise
PoA ≥
s(1− k)1−
1
s − s
1− s
−
kr˜
1
k
−1(1 − k)1−
1
k − k
1− k
k +
k − kr˜
1
k
−1(1− k)1−
1
k
1− k
where we replace the ratio r as the rescaled ratio of the
purchasing cost to the selling price, r˜ := c
pX (0) ∈ [0, 1]. It
turns out that the derived bounds in generalized newsvendor
problem are as well as the ones in original newsvendor
problem. Lastly, both bounds are also simply derived in the
case that the retailer is the leader in pull serial supply chain.
G. Example: A toy model
The previous argument has indicated only if one validates
both bounds of the performance ratio in resolving generalized
newsvendor problem, we need not to restrict to the literature of
supply chain management. As a matter of course, with respect
to the ensemble of increasing generalized failure rate without
the context of operations management, one also needs to vin-
dicate the improved and developed bounds. Hence we would
apply M(Q) := tanh(Q) for simplicity of the discussion
because X (Q) = 1 − tanh2(Q), g(Q) = 2Q tanh(Q) and
l(Q) = 2sinh2(Q) are derived briefly and analytically.
Firstly, in the case that the manufacturer is the leader in push
serial supply chain (as a matter of convenience we address so),
it is comparatively easy to execute the algorithm based on eq.
(10), then Qc and Qd are illustrated in Fig. 10 and PoA and
the derived bounds are indicated in Fig. 11. Conclusionally, it
turns out that our approach is valid in this case. While, in the
case that the retailer is the leader in pull serial supply chain, it
is also to perform the iteration based on eq. (11), then Qc and
Qd are shown in Fig. 10 and PoA and the derived bounds are
presented in Fig. 12. Similarly it turns out that our procedure
is supported validly in this case.
IV. GEOMETRIC INTERPRETATION
In the previous section, we have examined price of anarchy
with respect to generalized newsvendor problem. Furthermore
here, in order to comprehend the measure in depth [6], let us
provide a novel geometric interpretation with respect to price
of anarchy via the property of the convexity of −M (Q) [2],
[15].
A. Geometric interpretation; the integrated supply chain
First, one can divide two distinguished functions with
respect to the expected aggregate profit function, Π = −cQ+
pM (Q) as follows; y1 (Q) = cQ+Π and y2 (Q) = pM (Q)
where from y1(Q) = y2(Q), that is, if there exists intersection
point, then Π = −cQ + pM (Q) is derived. As shown in
Fig. 13 that Π implies the intercept of y1(Q). Or as another
representation, the linear function of Q which has slope c
and passes through an intersection point (Q∗, pM (Q∗)) is
represented as follows; y∗1 (Q) = c (Q−Q∗) + pM (Q∗).
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Fig. 11. The ratio r v.s. price of anarchy and the bounds. In push serial
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Fig. 12. The ratio r v.s. price of anarchy and the bounds. In pull serial
supply chain, the retailer is the decision maker.
Indeed the intercept of y∗1(Q) describes also Π. Show Fig. 13,
in order to maximize the intercept of y1(Q), both functions
should intersect at one point (denoted by (Qc, pM (Qc)))
at least. Since the derivatives of both functions of Q, i.e.
∂y1(Q)
∂Q
= c and ∂y2(Q)
∂Q
= pX (Q), are yielded easily,
∂y1 (Q)
∂Q
=
∂y2 (Q)
∂Q
at Q = Qc, namely
c = pM (Qc) , (12)
is possible to be sufficiently satisfied. Thus we can resolve the
unique optimal solution of the integrated inventory manage-
ment.
(Qc, pM (Qc))
(Q∗, pM (Q∗))
Π(Qc) = −cQc + pM (Qc)
y2(Q) = pM (Q)
y1(Q) = cQ + Π
Q
Fig. 13. The maximum of intercept of linear function implies the extremum
of the expected total profit function.
One point should be worthy to be noticed here. X (Q), the
derivative of M (Q) of Q, is not always necessary for the
continuous function of Q (however by definition, M(Q) is
satisfied with the continuous function because of the concav-
ity). For example, the given function,
pM (Q) :=
{
log (1 +Q) 0 ≤ Q ≤ Qv
v (Q−Qv) + log (1 +Qv) Qv < Q
is defined with constant Qv and v where v < 11+Qv is required
because X (Q) is a nonincreasing function of Q. Then with
respect to the slope of y1(Q) in v ≤ c ≤ 11+Qv , it turns out
that the intersection point is (Qv, pM (Qv)), however, this
optimal solution is not satisfied with eq. (12) indeed. That is,
we need to comprehend that eq. (12) describes the sufficient
condition but not the necessary. Without the loss of generality,
so as to prevent also us from misleading in practice, we should
confirm the behaviors of both functions y1(Q) = cQ+Π and
y2(Q) = pM(Q) being supported by the picture such as Fig.
13.
B. Geometric interpretation; the manufacturer is the leader in
push serial supply chain
According to the explanation in the previous subsection,
with respect to ΠR = −wQ + pM(Q), in order to solve
the optimization problem of the follower, the two functions,
y1(Q) := wQ + Π
R and y2(Q) := pM(Q) are denoted.
As shown in Fig. 14 that the supremum of the intercept of
y1(Q) (the optimal solution is (Qd, pM (Qd))) describes the
desirable whole profit and the expected total profit in the
centralized case, Π(Qc) is greater than maxΠR because of
c ≤ w. Furthermore since the leader’s aggregate profit is
represented as ΠM = (w − c)Qd, Fig. 14 illustrates that
9(Qd, pM (Qd))
(Qc, pM (Qc))
y1(Q) = cQ + Πy1(Q) = wQ + Π
R
y2(Q) = pM (Q)
maxΠR = −wQd + pM (Qd)
Π(Qc) = −cQc + pM (Qc)
ΠM = (w − c)Qd
Q
Fig. 14. A geometric interpretation of price of anarchy; the manufacturer
is the leader in push serial supply chain. Fig. 15 illustrates how Qd is
determined.
Q
1− k
k
(Qd, pX (Qd))
(Qc, pX (Qc))
pX (Qd) + pX
′(Qd)(Q−Qd)
−pX ′(Qd)Qd
pX (Qd)− (−pX
′(Qd)Qd)
= pX (Qd)(1− g(Qd)) = pX (Qc)
pX (Q)
Fig. 15. Qd is satisfied with pX (Qd) (1− g(Qd)) = pX (Qc).
Π(Qc) ≥ (w−c)Qd+(−wQd + pM (Qd)) =: Π (Qd), where
Π(Qd) connotes the expected profit of the decentralized case.
Conclusionally, it turns out that PoA is greater than unit in
nature.
C. Geometric interpretation; the retailer is the leader in pull
serial supply chain
In the other case, so as to analyze the optimization problem
of the follower, with respect to ΞM = −cQ + wM(Q), the
two functions, y1(Q) := cQ+ΞM and y2(Q) := wM(Q), are
defined. As shown in Fig. 16 that the maximum of the intercept
of y1(Q) (the optimal solution is (Qd, pM (Qd))) represents
the desirable entire profit and the expected aggregate profit in
the integrated case Π(Qc) is greater than maxΞM because of
w ≤ p. Moreover if the leader’s whole profit is ΞR = (p −
w)M(Qd), Fig. 16 depicts, Π(Qc) ≥ −cQd + wM (Qd) +
(p − w)M (Qd) = Π (Qd). In conclusion, it turns out that
PoA is greater than unit in general.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We discussed price of anarchy, the performance ratio,
which could characterize the loss of efficiency of the dis-
ΞR = (p− w)M (Qd)
max ΞM = −cQd + wM (Qd)
(Qc, pM (Qc))
Q
(Qd, wM (Qd))
Π(Qc) = −cQc + pM (Qc)
y2(Q) = pM (Q)
(Qd, pM (Qd))
y2(Q) = wM (Q)
y1(Q) = cQ + Ξ
M
y1(Q) = cQ + Π
Fig. 16. A geometric interpretation of price of anarchy; the retailer is the
leader in pull serial supply chain. Fig. 17 illustrates how Qd is determined.
Q
(Qd, pX (Qd))
(Qc, pX (Qc))
pX (Qd) + pX
′(Qd)(Q−Qd)
pX (Qd) = pX (Qc) + pX (Qc)l(Qd)
pX (Qc)l(Qd)
Fig. 17. Qd is satisfied with pX (Qd) (1 + l(Qd))−1 = pX (Qc).
tributed supply chain management compared with the inte-
grated supply chain management via newsvendor problem and
the generalization instead of bullwhip effect. In particular,
the performance ratios in some of remarkable decentralized
supply chain managements are analyzed theoretically and
numerically. Furthermore, with respect to the ensemble of
increasing generalized failure rate, which one can ensure that
the optimization problem of the follower could possess the
well-defined solution; (a) the upper bound which has been
investigated in the previous work [14] is improved in this
paper utilizing the more accurate evaluation of the integration
and (b) the lower bound is derived in the same manner, in
the case that the manufacturer could control the wholesale
price in push serial supply chain and in the case that the
retailer could adjust the wholesale price in pull serial supply
chain, namely the two cases that the follower makes to stock
the inventory. Moreover the framework handled in section II
has been developed and deepened for generalized newsvendor
problem, and we indicate that the loss of efficiency is measured
as well as original newsvendor problem. Hence price of
anarchy is possible to be one of the most unbeatable feature
quantity with respect to the convex optimization involving
Stackelberg leadership game [16]. While our approach is
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supported validly in some examples which are satisfied with
increasing generalized failure rate. Lastly without the loss of
generality, a geometric interpretation of price of anarchy has
been provided concretely.
The investigations of geometric interpretation of price of
anarchy in multiechelon case, and of the other ensembles
which are guaranteed that the optimization problem of the
follower can possess the well-defined solution are promising
topics for future works.
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APPENDIX A
PRELIMINARIES
A. Global optimal and local optimal
In this appendix, let us introduce the relationship between
global optimal and local optimal. Well, we assume that
X and Y are convex sets and employ as x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y , respectively. Furthermore two real-valued functions
f(x, y) and g(x, y) are bounded from above in the region
(x, y) ∈ X ⊗Y . Then a novel function is denoted as follows;
F (x, y) := f(x, y) + g(x, y) where this function is also
satisfied with bounded above and let (x∗, y∗) be an extremal
solution of F (x, y) in the given finite region. While (x∗∗, y∗∗)
indicates an extremal solution of f(x, y), that is, one part of
F (x, y), then, F (x∗, y∗) ≥ F (x∗∗, y∗∗) is obtained in general.
Thus price of anarchy is greater than or equal to unit by
definition.
B. The concavity of ∫ Q0 dξF (ξ)
Because F (ξ) is a nonincreasing function of ξ firstly,∫ Q
0 dξF (ξ) ≤
∫ Q0
0 dξF (ξ) + F (Q0)(Q − Q0) is held for
any Q and Q0 in general, therefore, for any Q,Q′ and
λ ∈ [0, 1], the concavity, λ
∫ Q
0 dξF (ξ)+(1−λ)
∫ Q′
0 dξF (ξ) ≤∫ λQ+(1−λ)Q′
0 dξF (ξ) is satisfied when Q0 = λQ + (1 − λ)Q
′ is
rewritten. Additionally, if Q = Qd and Q0 = Qc, it is
also proved that PoA is greater than or equal to unit from∫ Q
0
dξF (ξ) ≤
∫ Q0
0
dξF (ξ) + F (Q0)(Q −Q0).
C. Young’s inequality
Because F (ξ) is a nonincreasing function of ξ, Qϕ +∫ 1
ϕ
dyF
−1
(y) ≥
∫ Q
0 dξF (ξ) ≥ QF (Q) is held without the
loss of generality for any ϕ ≥ 0. The more left inequality
is termed as Young’s inequality, iff F (Q) = ϕ gives the
equality. Therefore the more right inequality is obtained from∫ Q
0 dξF (ξ) − QF (Q) =
∫ 1
F (Q) dyF
−1
(y) ≥ 0 at F (Q) = ϕ
without the property of increasing generalized failure rate [7],
[9].
D. A proof of nondecreasing function l(Q)
If g(Q) is increasing generalized failure rate, then l(Q) is
strictly satisfied with ∂l(Q)
∂Q
≥ 0. Because one can prepare
a novel function firstly, j(Q) := 1X (Q)
∫ Q
0
dξX (ξ), where
∂j(Q)
∂Q
= 1 + l(Q). Here we allow to rewrite l(Q) as
l(Q) = j(Q)g(Q)
Q
. From the derivative of log l(Q) with respect
to Q,
1
l(Q)
∂l(Q)
∂Q
=
1
g(Q)
∂g(Q)
∂Q
+
g(Q)−
(
1−
Q
j(Q)
)
Q
,
is calculated where Q, j(Q), g(Q) and l(Q) are nonnegative
by definition. Hence as proof by contradiction, g(Q) < 1 −
Q
j(Q) is assumed. Then the derivative of 1 −
Q
j(Q) is derived
to be negative exactly. Thus g(Q) > 0 > 1− Q
j(Q) is yielded
where limQ→0 g(Q) = limQ→0
(
1− Q
j(Q)
)
= 0, however this
result is inconsistent with the assumption g(Q) < 1 − Q
j(Q) ,
namely g(Q) ≥ 1 − Q
j(Q) is held in nature. Therefore it is
proved that l(Q) is a nondecreasing function of Q.
E. Magnitude relation of price of anarchy
From Young’s inequality and the discussion of the previous
appendix, l(Q) ≥ g(Q) and l(Q)g(Q)− l(Q)+ g(Q) ≥ 0 are
derived, respectively. Therefore the relationship between the
derivative of the inventory level Qd,pull in pull serial supply
chain with respect to the rate r and the derivative of the
inventory level Qd,push in push serial supply chain with respect
to the rate is obtained as ∂Qd,pull
∂r
≤
∂Qd,push
∂r
strictly. Thus
Qd,pull = −
∫ 1
r
dr
∂Qd,pull
∂r
≥ −
∫ 1
r
dr
∂Qd,push
∂r
= Qd,push is
held. Moreover because Π is a nondecreasing function of Q
in Q < Qc, PoA in push configuration is greater than or equal
to PoA in pull configuration in general.
F. Price of anarchy in the fixed order case
For any Q ∈ (0, Qc], the sufficient and necessary condition
of the equality 1 − g(Q) = (1 + l(Q))−1 is M(Q) ∝ Q.
In original newsvendor problem, it implies that F (ξ) = 1 for
ξ ≤ Q0 and 0, otherwise, namely the order is fixed at ξ = Q0,
then Qc = Qd = Q0 is held in each decentralized supply
chain. In conclusion, if the order is constant, the performances
of the four cases discussed in this paper are consistent with
one another.
APPENDIX B
N SERIAL SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
Our approach based on generalized newsvendor problem is
simply to be extended N serial supply chain management (the
case of N = 2 is already mentioned). The optimal inventory
level of each distributed management is devoted as follows:
(a) The manufacturer is the decision maker in push sup-
ply chain. Qd is derived from the following equation;(
1 +Q ∂
∂Q
)N−1
X (Q) = r where r = c/p and
roughly speaking, Qd is probably to be satisfied with
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the condition X (Q) (1− g(Q))N−1 ≥ r. Here one
point should be noteworthy. The optimal inventory
level Qd is not always satisfied with the equality,
X (Q) (1− g(Q))
N−1
= r, because ∂
ng(Q)
∂Qn
= 0 is
not always held for each integer in 1 < n < N
Moreover it is hardly desirable that the comparative
tight both bounds of price of anarchy in this con-
figuration are derived by the optimal inventory level
which is satisfied with the above inequality.
(b) The retailer is the decision maker in push supply
chain. Since the inventory is stored at the leader’s
site, Qd = Qc is desirable.
(c) The manufacturer is the decision maker in pull
supply chain. Nevertheless to say, as the goods is
stocked at the upstream site, Qd = Qc is expected.
(d) The retailer is the decision maker in pull supply
chain. Qd is derived as the solution of the following
relation,
(
1 +
∫
Q
0
dξX (ξ)
X (Q)
∂
∂Q
)N−1
1
X (Q) =
1
r
where
roughly speaking, Qd is possible to be satisfied with
the condition X (Q) (1 + l(Q))−(N−1) ≥ r.
APPENDIX C
MULTIPLE MATERIALS AND MULTIPLE ITEMS
We could develop our approach in the case of the in-
ventory management of S multiple materials and I multiple
items briefly. Let ~c := {c1, c2, · · · , cS}T ∈ RS and ~Q :=
{Q1, Q2, · · · , QS}
T ∈ RS be the purchasing costs and the in-
ventory levels of the materials, respectively. Furthermore ~p :=
{p1, p2, · · · , pI}
T
∈ RI and ~M := {M1,M2, · · · ,MI}T ∈
R
I represent the selling prices and the order levels of the
items, respectively. The entry of the order levels is assumed
to be strictly a convex function of ~Q. The expected whole
profit is defined as follows; Π = −~cT ~Q + ~pT ~M, where the
notation T denotes the matrix transpose. First, the optimal
inventory levels of the integrated supply chain ~Qc is held with
the following equation,
cs =
I∑
µ=1
pµ
(
∂Mµ
∂Qs
)
~Q→~Qc
.
Next, in the case that the manufacturer is the leader in push
serial supply chain, the inventory levels of the decentralized
configuration ~Qd is satisfied as follows;
cs =
I∑
µ=1
pµ
[
∂Mµ
∂Qs
+
S∑
t=1
Qt
∂2Mµ
∂Qs∂Qt
]
~Q→~Qd
.
Therefore the wholesale prices ~w := {w1, w2, · · · , wS} ∈ RS
is denoted as follows; ws =
∑I
µ=1 pµ
(
∂Mµ
∂Qs
)
~Q→~Qd
. Lastly,
in the case that the retailer is the decision maker in pull
serial supply chain, the inventory levels of the distributed
configurations ~Qd is satisfied as follows;
pµ =
S∑
s=1
cs
[
∂Qs
∂Mµ
+
I∑
ν=1
Mν
∂2Qs
∂Mµ∂Mν
]
~Q→~Qd
,
where the desirable wholesale prices ~w is held as follows;
wµ =
∑S
s=1 cs
(
∂Qs
∂Mµ
)
~Q→~Qd
.
Three points should be noted here. Firstly, several specific
problems which are possible to be handled via our approach
have been already investigated [1], [3], [12]. Especially, only if
the solution with respect to the given optimization problem is
definite in several types, utilizing such as Lagrange’s multiplier
method, we could resolve in the same way. Next, in the
case of the supply chain management in multiperiod (i.e.
S = I), let cs, ps, Qs and ξs be the purchasing cost, the
selling price, the inventory level and the demand at term s,
respectively. Further the demands ~ξ := {ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξS}T are
distributed with the given multivariate density function f(~ξ)
and Ms :=
∫∞
0
d~ξf(~ξ)ms(~ξ, ~Q) indicates the order at term s
where ms(~ξ, ~Q) describes that the order at term s is depended
on the market trend strongly. Likewise, it turns out that one
can deal with multiperiod case based on our approach (c.f.
bullwhip effect). Lastly, in the case of N serial supply chain,
the optimal inventory levels ~Qd in the two cases are satisfied
with the following equations;
cs =
I∑
µ=1
pµ
[
Tr
~t
N−1∏
i=1
(
δtis +Qti
∂
∂Qti
)
∂Mµ
∂Qs
]
~Q→ ~Qd
,
pµ =
S∑
s=1
cs
[
Tr
~ν
N−1∏
i=1
(
δνiµ +Mνi
∂
∂Mνi
)
∂Qs
∂Mµ
]
~Q→~Qd
,
respectively, where ~t := {t1, t2, · · · , tN−1} and ~ν :=
{ν1, ν2, · · · , νN−1} are used, δab indicates Kronecker’s delta
which is the entry of the unit matrix and the notation Tr~t and
Tr~ν denote the summation over all possible states of ~t and of
~ν, respectively.
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